The Punjab and Haryana High Court has acquitted Bhanu Prakash, who was convicted in 1998 for an offence under Section 304-B IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jagadhri, and sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The acquittal comes after 22 years of incarceration and legal proceedings.
The case arose from the death of Geetika Sharma, the appellant's wife, who sustained 90% burn injuries at the matrimonial home on August 4, 1998, and died five days later on August 9, 1998. The prosecution alleged that she had been subjected to harassment and cruelty in connection with dowry demands, and that the appellant had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. Her father filed a complaint and later sought enhancement of the sentence.
However, the deceased's own statements contradicted the prosecution's case. When brought to the hospital immediately after sustaining burn injuries, Geetika Sharma stated that she had suffered the burns accidentally. Subsequently, she made a dying declaration before a Judicial Magistrate, after the Magistrate obtained a doctor's opinion regarding her fitness to make the statement. In that declaration, she stated that she was painting the kitchen wall, and while soaking the paintbrush in kerosene oil, the kerosene splashed onto her clothes and the floor. The bottle fell, and since the gas stove was switched on, her clothes caught fire.
The Court noted that in neither of these accounts did the deceased implicate her husband or any other member of her matrimonial family. The High Court held that there was no convincing material to demonstrate that the Magistrate's statement had been recorded under any influence or that the deceased was incapable of understanding the questions and giving rational answers.
Justice Mandeep Pannu, delivering the judgment, observed that the dying declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate did not implicate the appellant. Rather, the deceased stated that she had sustained the burn injuries accidentally. The Court attached significance to the fact that Geetika survived for approximately five days after the incident. During this period, her parents had reached PGI, Chandigarh, and her mother was present with her. Yet, no complaint alleging dowry harassment or accusing the appellant of setting her on fire was made while she was alive. The FIR was registered only after her death on August 9, 1998.
The Court clarified that delay in lodging an FIR is not, by itself, sufficient to discard a prosecution case. However, in the facts of the case, the delay assumed significance when considered alongside the deceased's two contemporaneous accounts of accidental burning.
The prosecution had also relied upon a note dated May 3, 1998, allegedly written by the deceased, in which she accused her husband, father-in-law, and brother-in-law of harassment and stated that they would be responsible in case of her death. The Court emphasised that merely establishing that a woman died an unnatural death within the matrimonial home is not sufficient to attract Section 304-B IPC. The prosecution must establish that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry and that such cruelty or harassment occurred 'soon before' her death.
The expression 'soon before', the Court said, incorporates a requirement of proximity and there must be a 'proximate and live link' between the alleged dowry-related cruelty and the death. The Court further held that the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act does not arise automatically merely because the death was unnatural.
Justice Pannu stated that the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, therefore, cannot be invoked mechanically. It explained that the presumption arises only after the prosecution establishes the necessary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, including the element of dowry demand and proximate cruelty or harassment.
The Court held that the prosecution had failed to rule out the possibility of accidental death, which the deceased herself had consistently maintained. Consequently, the foundational requirements for invoking the presumption under Section 113-B were not satisfied. The appeal filed by Bhanu Prakash was allowed, and his conviction under Section 304-B IPC was set aside.