In a development that could redefine how Intellectual Property (IP) litigation is handled across India, the Supreme Court has agreed to examine a critical jurisdictional question: Can a Civil Judge (Senior Division), even when designated as a Commercial Court, entertain a trademark 'passing off' suit?
The legal community is closely watching the case of I.S.D.S. Private Limited & Anr. v. M/S Khemka Food Products Pvt. Ltd & Anr., where the apex court has issued notice to settle a conflict between the Trade Marks Act of 1999 and the Commercial Courts Act of 2015.
At the center of this dispute is Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Historically, this section has acted as a "protective shield" for trademark owners, ensuring that their complex cases are heard by senior judges. It explicitly states that no suit for trademark infringement or "passing off" (where someone tries to sell their goods as those of another) shall be started in any court "inferior to a District Court."
Traditionally, this meant that only a District Judge or an Additional District Judge could hear these cases. However, with the introduction of the Commercial Courts Act in 2015, the landscape changed. Many states, including Jharkhand, began designating Civil Judges (Senior Division)—who are technically a rank below District Judges—as "Commercial Courts" to handle business disputes of lower monetary values (between ₹3 lakh and ₹10 lakh).
The big question now is: Does the "label" of a Commercial Court give a Civil Judge the power to override the specific restriction in the Trade Marks Act?
The matter reached the Supreme Court following a judgment by the Jharkhand High Court. The case began in Jamshedpur, where Khemka Food Products filed a "passing off" suit. The Civil Judge (Senior Division)-I, acting as a Commercial Court, initially returned the case, ruling that he didn't have the jurisdiction because Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act requires the case to be in a District Court.
However, the Jharkhand High Court overturned this. The High Court reasoned that:
- The Commercial Courts Act (2018 amendment) reduced the "specified value" of disputes to ₹3 lakh, allowing lower-ranking judges to handle commercial matters.
- The term "District Court" in the Trade Marks Act refers to the level of jurisdiction, not necessarily the specific person of a "District Judge."
- Since the state government had officially designated these Civil Judges as Commercial Courts, they were no longer "inferior" in the context of commercial law.
On February 11, 2026, a bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice Atul Chandurkar noted that this is a "short point" of law with massive implications. The Supreme Court has asked: What meaning should be ascribed to the expression "in Court inferior to a District Court"?
If the Supreme Court agrees with the Jharkhand High Court, it would mean that trademark cases across India could be distributed among many more lower-level courts, potentially speeding up trials. If it disagrees, it will reaffirm that IP matters are of such high importance that only the senior-most judges in a district can handle them, regardless of the commercial value of the suit.
To understand this case, we need to break down a few key concepts into simple terms:
- Passing Off: This is a common-law remedy. It’s what happens when a business uses a name, logo, or "trade dress" (the look and feel of a product) that is so similar to another famous brand that it confuses the public. In this specific case, the dispute even involved whiskey brands (London Pride vs. Imperial Blue) where the "look" of the bottles was strikingly similar.
- Civil Judge (Senior Division): In the Indian judicial hierarchy, these judges handle mid-level civil cases. They are usually one step below the District and Sessions Judge.
- Commercial Court: These are specialized courts created to solve business disputes quickly to improve the "Ease of Doing Business" in India.
- Section 134: A specific rule in the Trade Marks Act that says, "Don't take these cases to the lowest civil courts; start at the District level."
This case is a classic example of "Statutory Interpretation." We have two laws: