The Supreme Court has quashed an FIR registered under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) against a petitioner accused of obtaining consent for sexual intercourse through a false promise of marriage. The bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice K Vinod Chandran observed that the allegations did not disclose an offence under the provision as the relationship between the parties was consensual and there was no evidence of deceitful intent at the time of making the promise.
The petitioner had approached the Supreme Court against an order of the Gujarat High Court which declined to quash the FIR. The High Court had relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Gulati v State of Haryana while dismissing the petition for quashing. The FIR alleged that the petitioner had induced the complainant into a physical relationship by promising to marry her and later resiled from the promise citing his mother's disapproval of the match.
In its reasoning, the bench referred to the principle laid down in Deepak Gulati which emphasized that for consent to be vitiated under Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code (now Section 28 of BNS), there must be adequate evidence showing that the accused had no intention whatsoever of fulfilling the promise to marry at the time it was made. The Court noted that a failure to keep a promise due to unclear or unavoidable circumstances does not automatically amount to a misconception of fact. It stressed that Section 90 IPC cannot be invoked to fasten criminal liability unless the court is satisfied that the accused never genuinely intended to marry the victim from the outset.
The Court explained that Section 69 BNS was introduced to carve out deceitful conduct involving a false promise of marriage from the graver offence of rape, while prescribing a specific penalty for such fraudulent inducement. It clarified that the language of Section 69 ‘deceitful means or by making a promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same’ requires proof that the promise was made with a deliberate intent not to fulfil it, which constitutes the deceitful conduct sought to be punished.
Examining the facts as disclosed in the complaint, the Court found that the petitioner and complainant had met on a digital platform, developed a friendship that progressed into a love affair, and that the petitioner had expressed his desire to marry the complainant during their first physical meeting. The complainant had succumbed to his entreaties and permitted sexual intercourse in February 2024, followed by a two-day hotel stay in April 2024. The bench observed that the statements in the complaint clearly indicated a consensual relationship and there was nothing to suggest that the complainant had agreed to sexual intercourse solely on the basis of a promise to marry.
The Court further noted that the complaint did not allege that physical relations on the first occasion were conditioned upon a promise to marry. It reiterated that the complainant’s submission to the petitioner’s entreaties during their first meeting was stated without any mention of it being contingent on a marriage promise. On this basis, the Court concluded that there was no indication of deceitful conduct on the part of the petitioner.
The bench also addressed the specific circumstance of the petitioner resiling from his promise due to his mother’s objection. It held that refusal to marry because of parental disapproval, without evidence of prior deceitful intent, does not constitute deceit under Section 69 BNS. Such a situation, the Court observed, falls within the realm of a promise made in good faith that could not be fulfilled due to external circumstances, not fraudulent inducement.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the special leave petition, set aside the Gujarat High Court’s order, and quashed the FIR registered against the petitioner under Section 69 BNS. The judgment underscores that a mere breach of promise to marry, absent proof of fraudulent intent at the time of making the promise, does not attract criminal liability under the new provision.