Justice K Vinod Chandran of the Supreme Court dissented from the majority ruling delivered by a bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justice Augustine George Masih on the review petitions challenging the Court's 2025 judgment that had mandated a three-year law practice requirement for entry into judicial service. The majority, in its decision delivered on Friday, held that effective from April 2027, candidates would need only one year of law practice to be eligible for appointment as civil judge, followed by one year of intensive training at the State judicial academy and six months each of clerkship at the district court and High Court.
Justice Chandran, however, maintained that the three-year practice criterion established in the 2025 verdict was imperative and should not be disturbed. He emphasized that there existed no ground for reconsideration of the earlier ruling. Citing the prevailing opinion among a vast majority of High Courts, he stated that experience at the Bar was considered essential for individuals transitioning directly from academic life into judicial roles.
Justice Chandran expressed his definite opinion, aligning with the earlier unanimous view, that Bar exposure is necessary for law graduates to gain familiarity with the practical realities of litigation and human affairs before assuming judicial responsibilities. He observed that the departure from this norm had proven counterproductive, as reflected in the views of High Courts, which he described as a clear indication of the mindset of the largest stakeholder—the litigant public.
He warned that relaxing the requirement would risk producing a cadre of careerists rather than capable jurists. According to Justice Chandran, the requirement of prior Bar experience is essential in the immediate future to ensure that those entering judicial service are equipped to enrich a justice system responsive to the needs of the nation, society, and its people.
Drawing a parallel to professional norms in legal practice, Justice Chandran questioned how it could be considered safe to entrust decision-making authority in cases to individuals fresh out of college when even senior lawyers or litigants would hesitate to assign a case to such persons. He stressed that the formative years of a lawyer’s development occur not only through courtroom advocacy but also through office work, file familiarity, and interaction with senior counsel in the corridors of the Court—elements that cannot be replicated through structured training alone.
Justice Chandran further highlighted the asymmetry in accountability: while a judicial error may be corrected through appeal, a lawyer’s mistake can often be addressed by an experienced judge, senior colleague, or court staff with firsthand knowledge of proceedings. He argued that qualities such as proficiency in drafting, legal research, cross-examination, and argument formulation are cultivated over years of practice and cannot be imparted through pre- or post-recruitment training schedules.
Concluding his dissent, Justice Chandran asserted that no training programme, whether undertaken before or after recruitment, could provide a budding jurist—whether lawyer or judge—with the intrinsic understanding of life’s struggles and litigants’ anxieties that is gained only through actual Bar practice. He maintained that this lived experience, absorbed through briefs and client interactions, remains indispensable for meaningful judicial service.