In a significant judgment aimed at preserving the efficiency of dispute resolution in India, the Supreme Court has clarified that arbitral proceedings commence the moment a notice invoking arbitration is received by the opposite party. The Court explicitly ruled that the "commencement" of arbitration cannot be linked to the date a party files a petition in court to appoint an arbitrator.

A Bench comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih observed that the commencement of arbitral proceedings is a "statutory event" defined exclusively under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The legal dispute centered on a technical but crucial question: If a court grants an interim stay or protection to a party, and the law requires arbitration to "commence" within 90 days of that order, does the clock stop when the party sends a legal notice to the opponent, or only when they move the High Court to appoint an arbitrator?

The Karnataka High Court had previously taken the view that simply sending a notice was not enough and that the arbitration only "initiated" once a Section 11 petition was filed in court. The Supreme Court has now set aside this ruling, calling it a "misconception" of the law.

The case arose from a 2019 franchise agreement between Regenta Hotels Private Limited and M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point for the operation of a hotel in Srinagar. Disputes cropped up when Regenta Hotels alleged that certain partners of the firm were interfering with the hotel’s smooth functioning.

Seeking urgent relief, Regenta Hotels approached a trial court in Bengaluru, which granted an interim injunction on February 17, 2024. Following this protection, Regenta issued a formal arbitration notice under Section 21 on April 11, 2024. This notice was successfully received by the firm.

However, when the firm refused to agree on an arbitrator, Regenta filed a Section 11 petition before the High Court on June 28, 2024. Both the Trial Court and the High Court later dismissed Regenta’s interim protection, reasoning that since the Section 11 petition was filed more than 90 days after the initial court order, the arbitration had failed to "commence" in time as per Section 9(2) of the Act.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court’s narrow interpretation. The Bench traced the history of the Act and looked at Sections 9, 21, and 43(2) to explain the design of the law.

1. Section 21 is the Exclusive Trigger

The Court held that Section 21 provides a clear definition: arbitral proceedings begin on the date the respondent receives a request to refer the dispute to arbitration.

"The settled position as emerged is that the commencement of arbitral proceedings is a statutory event defined exclusively under Section 21 of the Act... no judicial application i.e. whether under Section 9 or Section 11 petition, constitutes commencement," the Court held.

2. Delinking Judiciary from Commencement

The Court noted that the legislature consciously decided to keep the start of arbitration separate from any court proceedings. By sending a notice, the party has already "set the proceedings in motion." Requiring a court filing to count as commencement would add an unnecessary hurdle and delay the process.

3. Clarifying "Initiation" vs "Commencement"

The Court also addressed Rule 9(4) of the Karnataka Arbitration Rules, 2001, which uses the word "initiated." The High Court had argued that "initiation" meant filing a court case. The Supreme Court rejected this, stating that "initiation" in the rules cannot mean something different from "commencement" in the main Act. If they were treated differently, the 90-day protection period under Section 9(2) would become useless and easy to bypass.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Bench found that Regenta Hotels had issued the notice within the 90-day window following the February injunction. Therefore, the arbitration had legally commenced on time, regardless of when the Section 11 petition was filed.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restored the interim protection for Regenta Hotels, and requested the High Court to decide the pending petition for the appointment of an arbitrator expeditiously.

This ruling provides much-needed clarity for businesses and legal practitioners. It ensures that as long as a party takes the proactive step of invoking arbitration through a formal notice, their interim protections are safe from technical dismissals based on the timing of court filings.

Case Title: Regenta Hotels Private Limited vs. M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point & Ors.

Citation: 2026 INSC 32

Representing Appellant: Senior Advocate Nikhil Goel with Advocates Madiya Mushtaq, Nagarjun Sahu, and Pranjal Kishore.

Representing Respondents: Advocates Vivek Jain, Baani Khanna, and Atul Shankar Vinod.