Allahabad High Court Holds Shariat Law Permitting Marriage at Puberty Conflicts with POCSO and PCMA

The matter arose from an incident in Bulandshahr district where a police team, assisted by Child Line officials, intervened to prevent the impending marriage of a Muslim girl who was sixteen years old. The intervention was met with resistance; the petitioners, nineteen individuals allegedly connected with the girl’s family and community, are said to have assaulted and obstructed the rescue team. An FIR was registered against them for offences including assault, obstruction of public servants and related charges. The petitioners filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court seeking to quash the FIR, contending that the prosecution interfered with their personal law.

Arguments Advanced by the Petitioners

The petitioners relied on the Shariat or Muslim Personal Law, which, according to their submission, recognises a girl as competent to marry upon attaining puberty, generally understood to be around fifteen years of age. They argued that the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA) does not affect personal laws and therefore cannot be applied to invalidate a marriage permissible under their religious law. They further submitted that the FIR was mala fide and that the rescue team had exceeded its statutory mandate.

Bench’s Analysis of the Statutory Framework

The division bench, comprising Justice JJ Munir and Justice Achal Sachdev, examined the interplay between personal law and the prohibitory statutes. The court observed that the PCMA and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) are enactments grounded in public health and national policy, reflecting a scientific understanding of the harms associated with early marriage. The bench emphasised that these statutes operate as prohibitory laws that apply uniformly to all citizens, irrespective of religion.

Justice JJ Munir, while delivering the observation, stated that no personal law can override the prohibition on child marriage introduced by the PCMA or nullify the statutory effects of the POCSO Act. The bench reasoned that permitting marriage below the age of eighteen would inevitably lead to carnal relations, which, being almost inseparable from the marital relationship, would constitute a violation of the POCSO Act. The court quoted its own reasoning: “The PCMA and the POCSO Act are statutes that are based on public health and national policy in this regard. They have a scientific understanding to them, legislatively translated into prohibitory statutes and there can be no escape from it for anyone.”

Reference to Judicial Precedents

The bench acknowledged that different High Courts have expressed divergent views on whether personal law can prevail over the PCMA. It expressed complete agreement with the reasoning of the Kerala High Court, which had held that no personal law can override the prohibition on child marriage. The court also referred to a 2025 order of the Supreme Court in which the top court had expressed doubt on the issue, noting that the doubt arose pending the consideration of the Prohibition of Child Marriage (Amending) Bill, 2021. The bench noted that the bill had lapsed upon the dissolution of the Seventeenth Lok Sabha and that, to date, no authoritative pronouncement from the Supreme Court has settled the question.

Assessment of the Facts and Conduct of the Rescue Team

Turning to the factual matrix, the court found that there was a determined effort by the minor’s parents and members of the community to solemnise the marriage in contravention of the PCMA. The bench commended the police and the Child Line team for acting swiftly to rescue the girl, stating that their conduct constituted a bona fide discharge of their statutory duties to prevent a possible offence under the POCSO Act. The court observed that the victim was forcibly taken away from the care and custody of the rescue team until she was finally rescued, thereby establishing a prima facie case of obstruction of a public servant in the performance of duty.

Disposition of the Writ Petition

Having considered the arguments, the statutory provisions and the factual circumstances, the division bench concluded that there was no sufficient ground to interfere with the FIR. The petition seeking to quash the FIR was accordingly dismissed. The court directed that the other offences disclosed in the FIR require thorough investigation.