Accused Has No Right to Decide the Agency of Investigation: Calcutta High Court Dismisses Impleadment Pleas in Probe Writ

In a significant judgment that reinforces the boundaries of an accused person’s rights during the pre-cognizance stage, the Calcutta High Court has ruled that an accused—or even a prospective accused—cannot demand a seat at the table when the court is deciding the mode or agency of an investigation.

The Single Bench of Justice Suvra Ghosh, while presiding over the case of Arnab Paul v. State of West Bengal & Ors., clarified that criminal jurisprudence does not permit an accused person to interfere with the investigative process or choose which agency should probe the allegations against them. The Court emphasized that the "choice of the investigating agency" is a matter of judicial discretion and the internal functioning of the law, not a right vested in the person being investigated.

The legal battle originated from a writ petition filed by one Arnab Paul. Paul had approached the High Court alleging that the local police were showing bias and were in collusion with certain private individuals. He sought the Court’s intervention to ensure a fair and independent investigation into his complaint regarding police inaction.

However, the case took a procedural turn when two sets of applications for "impleadment" (the process of joining a legal proceeding as a party) were filed:

1. The Counter-Complainant: An individual who had previously lodged a separate FIR against Arnab Paul.
2. The Prospective Accused: Private individuals named in Paul’s complaint who feared they would be targeted if a specific investigation was ordered.

These applicants argued that since the writ petition contained allegations against them, any order passed by the Court regarding the investigation would "prejudice" their rights. They essentially wanted to be heard before the Court decided whether to hand over the case to a different agency or order a specific type of probe.

The applicants relied heavily on the new criminal laws of India—the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). Specifically, they pointed toward the proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS, which discusses the right of an accused to be heard before a Magistrate takes cognizance of a complaint.

They argued that:

1. The allegations in the writ petition cast a shadow on their character and legal standing.
2. The principles of natural justice require that no order affecting them should be passed without giving them an opportunity to explain their side.
3. They were "necessary and proper parties" to the litigation because the outcome would directly impact their liberty.

Justice Suvra Ghosh rejected these arguments with a clear and firm interpretation of criminal law. The Court’s decision rested on several foundational pillars of Indian criminal jurisprudence:

1. The Investigation is a Unilateral Process

The Court reiterated the settled law that an investigation is a process conducted by the state to uncover the truth. At this stage, the accused does not have a "right of audience." Whether the police conduct the probe or an independent agency like the CID or CBI is brought in, it remains a matter between the Court and the investigating authorities.

2. Misinterpretation of the BNSS

The Court addressed the applicants' reliance on the BNSS. Justice Ghosh clarified that Section 223(1) of the BNSS applies to proceedings before a Magistrate when dealing with a private complaint at the stage of taking cognizance. It does not apply to the initial stage of a police investigation or a writ petition seeking an investigation into police inaction.

The Court further noted that Section 175(3) of the BNSS also does not confer any right on the accused to be heard during the investigative phase. By distinguishing these sections, the High Court ensured that the new laws are not misused to stall or obstruct the speed of criminal probes.

3. Choice of Agency is Not the Accused’s Prerogative

One of the most vital points made by the Court was that an accused person cannot "choose" their investigator. If every person who apprehended an arrest or an investigation was allowed to intervene in court and challenge the choice of the agency, the entire criminal justice system would grind to a halt. The Court held that allowing such interventions would be "contrary to the settled principles governing criminal procedure."

4. Defining "Necessary Parties"

The Court found that the presence of the applicants was not required to decide the merits of the writ petition. Since the petitioner (Arnab Paul) was only asking for his own complaint to be investigated fairly—and was not seeking to quash the FIR against him—the applicants had no legal "locus standi" (right to appear) in this specific writ.

This ruling is a reminder of the "arm's length" distance that an accused must maintain from the investigative machinery. While the Indian Constitution guarantees a fair trial and protection against arbitrary arrest, these rights do not extend to controlling how the state or the courts organize an investigation.

For legal practitioners, this judgment provides clarity on the application of BNSS in writ jurisdictions. It prevents the "impleadment tactic" often used by influential parties to delay proceedings by becoming a party to every related petition.

The Calcutta High Court’s dismissal of the impleadment applications serves as a safeguard for judicial efficiency. By ruling that an accused has no right to be heard on the mode or agency of investigation, Justice Suvra Ghosh has protected the sanctity of the "pre-cognizance" stage.

The message from the Court is clear: The law will take its course, and while the rights of the accused are protected during trial, they cannot be used as a shield to interfere with the state’s duty to investigate a crime.

Case Details:

1. Case Title: Arnab Paul v. State of West Bengal & Ors.
2. Case No: WPA No. 28933 of 2025
3. Bench: Justice Suvra Ghosh
4. Date of Order: February 9, 2026