In the quiet, deliberate atmosphere of the Supreme Court, a sharp observation recently cut through the legal arguments, highlighting a profound irony in the functioning of the Indian state. While hearing challenges to the new law governing the appointment of Election Commissioners, the bench—led by Justice Dipankar Datta—remarked with pointed wit that they "wish judges were appointed with the same speed" as the poll panel chiefs. This statement is more than a casual grievance; it is a surgical critique of the executive’s selective efficiency, where political imperatives seem to accelerate administrative machinery that otherwise grinds slowly when it comes to the judiciary.
The Court’s observation stems from the recent appointment of two Election Commissioners, a process that was completed with breathtaking velocity—reportedly within a single day of the selection committee meeting. In contrast, the appointment of High Court and Supreme Court judges often languishes in a bureaucratic labyrinth for months, if not years, after the Collegium has made its recommendations. This disparity suggests a hierarchy of urgency within the corridors of power, where the "referees" of the electoral process are seated at lightning speed, while the "arbiters" of justice are forced to wait at the threshold of executive approval.
Behind this judicial irony lies a deeper struggle for institutional equilibrium. By highlighting the speed of EC appointments, the Court is drawing attention to the "legislative vacuum" that the government successfully filled to its own advantage. For decades, the appointment of the Election Commission was left to the sole discretion of the executive, a "tyranny of the elected" that was only recently challenged by the judiciary. The current friction arises because the new law—passed with similar speed—ensures that the executive retains a decisive 2-1 majority in the selection process, effectively sidelining the Chief Justice of India.
From a constitutional perspective, the "speed" mentioned by the Court is a double-edged sword. While efficiency is generally a virtue, in the context of independent institutions, extreme haste can be perceived as a lack of due diligence or a move to preempt judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court is effectively asking: if the state can mobilize its resources to fill a vacancy in the Election Commission in twenty-four hours, why do judicial files gather dust? This question touches upon the "Memorandum of Procedure," the contested guidebook for judge appointments that remains a focal point of tension between the Law Ministry and the Supreme Court.