The Telangana High Court has quashed criminal proceedings instituted against a primary school coordinator under Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, holding that the mere designation of 'coordinator' does not satisfy the statutory requirement of having 'actual charge of' or 'control over' a child.
The Single Judge Bench of Justice Juvvadi Sridevi allowed a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to quash the charge sheet and proceedings pending before a trial court at Medchal-Malkajgiri. The petitioner was accused of ill-treating a five-year-old UKG student by keeping the child outside the classroom and denying access to drinking water and the washroom, allegedly due to the non-payment of school fees.
Statutory Ingredient of 'Actual Charge' Not Established
The Court examined the essential ingredients of Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. The provision stipulates that whoever, having the actual charge of, or control over, a child, assaults, abandons, abuses, exposes, or wilfully neglects the child in a manner likely to cause unnecessary mental or physical suffering, shall be punishable with imprisonment up to three years, a fine of one lakh rupees, or both.
Justice Sridevi observed that the prosecution failed to establish prima facie that the petitioner exercised actual charge or control over the victim in the manner contemplated by the statute. The Court emphasised that the petitioner held the position of Coordinator for Nursery to Class II and was not the class teacher of the victim. Consequently, the requisite statutory ingredient could not be presumed solely by virtue of her administrative designation.
What constitutes 'actual charge or control' under Section 75 of the JJ Act?
The Court held that 'actual charge' or 'control' under Section 75 requires a direct, functional relationship of authority and supervision over the specific child at the relevant time. A mere administrative title such as 'coordinator' does not automatically confer such control; the prosecution must demonstrate that the accused had immediate custodial responsibility for the child when the alleged neglect occurred.
Reliance on Supreme Court Precedent
The petitioner's counsel, Advocate Y. Sonanjali, relied on the Supreme Court decision in S.C. Narang v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2025). In that ruling, the apex court held that the Chairman of a school's Managing Committee could not be deemed to have 'actual charge of' or 'control over' every child in the school merely by virtue of his positional authority. The High Court found this precedent applicable, reinforcing that statutory liability under Section 75 demands a factual nexus of control, not an institutional hierarchy.
Procedural Lapses and Internal Inquiry Findings
The Court took note of the procedural history preceding the criminal case. The de facto complainant, the child's mother, had submitted a complaint to the school management on April 1, 2026, levelling identical allegations. Pursuant to this, the school constituted an independent committee for inquiry. The committee's findings did not substantiate the allegations against the petitioner. Furthermore, the committee observed that the conduct of the complainant-mother during the incident was contrary to the decorum expected within school premises, noting the use of inappropriate language while referring to the nursery coordinator.
Despite these developments, the investigating officer mechanically filed the charge sheet without examining any member of the school management or staff, even though the alleged incident occurred within the school premises during school hours. The Court remarked that the absence of independent witnesses, while not independently fatal to the prosecution case, assumes relevance when considered alongside the nature of the allegations and the absence of prima facie material establishing the essential statutory ingredients of the offence.
Comparison of Allegations and Statutory Requirements
Allegation by Prosecution | Statutory Requirement (Section 75, JJ Act) | Court's Finding |
|---|---|---|
Petitioner kept child outside classroom | Accused must have 'actual charge of' or 'control over' the child | Petitioner was Coordinator, not class teacher; no evidence of direct custodial control |
Denied drinking water and washroom access | Conduct must be likely to cause unnecessary mental or physical suffering | Alleged conduct not linked to accused's statutory authority over child |
Incident occurred over unpaid fees | Wilful neglect or abuse by person having charge/control | Motive alleged, but statutory nexus of control missing |
The Court concluded that Section 75 of the Act could not be applied to the petitioner on the materials available on record. The criminal proceedings were quashed, and the charge sheet was set aside.
The judgment underscores the necessity for investigating agencies to distinguish between administrative designations and the functional exercise of custodial control over children before invoking the stringent provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act.