The Supreme Court on Monday stayed the Madras High Court’s order dated July 1, 2026, which had quashed the appointment of seventeen Personal Assistants to Judges of the Madras High Court. The stay was granted by a bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta after hearing a special leave petition filed by nine of the candidates whose appointments were set aside by the High Court.
The Madras High Court had taken up a suo motu writ petition to examine alleged irregularities in the process for selecting Personal Assistants to Judges. According to the High Court’s findings, the selection process commenced on June 7, 2023, when applications were invited from employees working in various cadres such as Technical Assistant to Librarian, Assistant Section Officer, Translator, Assistant Court Fee Examiner, Personal Assistant to the Registrars, Senior Typist, Computer Operator, Personal Clerk to the Deputy Registrars, Assistant, Typist, Reader/Examiner, Telephone Operator, Cashier and Xerox Operator.
The eligibility criteria prescribed under Rule 14A of the Madras High Court Service Rules, 2015, required candidates to have passed the Government Technical Examination in Shorthand and Typewriting in English Higher Grade. However, the circular issued by the authorities permitted individuals possessing only Junior or Intermediate Grade in Shorthand or Typewriting to apply, on the condition that they would acquire the requisite Higher Grade qualification within two years from the date of appointment.
The High Court observed that this circular was inconsistent with the service rules because it granted an unjustified grace period to candidates who did not meet the prescribed qualification. The Court held that relaxing a mandatory condition through a circular, without any valid justification, amounted to arbitrariness and violated the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. It further noted that the requirement of Higher Grade Shorthand and Typewriting is a fundamental qualification for the post of Personal Assistant, and diluting it through an administrative circular could unjustly benefit candidates who were otherwise ineligible.
In reviewing the records, the High Court found that candidates who lacked the prescribed qualification, were over‑aged or under‑qualified were allowed to participate in the selection process. The Court rejected the contention that the candidates could retain their posts because they had acquired the necessary qualification during the pendency of the proceedings, observing that many other employees might have also obtained the qualification and that equal opportunity required opening the selection to all eligible persons.
The High Court concluded that the authorities had relaxed the service rules to accommodate in‑service candidates who did not possess the required eligibility, instead of initiating a direct recruitment process as envisaged by the rules. It warned that such a practice would send an incorrect message to the public about the sanctity of recruitment norms. Consequently, the High Court set aside the appointments and granted liberty to the Madras High Court to conduct a fresh selection in accordance with the service rules.
Aggrieved by the High Court’s judgment, nine of the affected candidates filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court bench, after hearing the parties, issued an order directing that notice be issued to the respondents and that the matter be returnable within four weeks. In the interim, the bench ordered that the effect and operation of the Madras High Court’s judgment shall remain stayed.
The stay preserves the status quo of the seventeen appointments until the Supreme Court examines the merits of the special leave petition. The decision underscores the Court’s willingness to intervene when a High Court’s finding of arbitrariness may affect substantive rights of candidates, while also ensuring that the underlying recruitment process is not disrupted pending final adjudication.
Legal experts note that the interim stay raises important questions about the extent to which administrative relaxations of statutory recruitment rules can be justified, particularly in the context of judicial appointments. The forthcoming hearing will likely examine whether the circular’s provision for a grace period constitutes a permissible relaxation or an impermissible violation of equality and merit‑based selection principles.
The parties are now directed to file their respective counter‑affidavits and written submissions within the stipulated period, after which the Supreme Court will hear the matter afresh and determine the final outcome regarding the validity of the selection process and the appointments of the seventeen Personal Assistants to Judges.