The Supreme Court, comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Augustine George Masih, dismissed the Union government’s appeal against a Himachal Pradesh High Court judgment that had found the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in violation of Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. The Bench held that the CRPF had medically invalidated a driver after he developed a visual disability during service, instead of accommodating him in an alternative post as required by law.

The Court observed that the CRPF had failed in its duty as a “model employer” by not offering the respondent any alternate posting despite the statutory mandate of Section 47 of the Act. The Bench described Section 47 as peremptory in nature, emphasizing that its opening word “No” conveys a clear prohibition against discrimination in government employment. The Court explained that the provision guarantees equal opportunities and full participation for persons with disabilities, and imposes an obligation on the employer to either shift the employee to another post carrying the same pay and service benefits or, if that is not feasible, to adjust him to any other post, even by creating a supernumerary position personal to the employee.

Referring to the 2002 notification issued by the CRPF that sought to exempt combatant personnel from the application of Section 47, the Bench clarified that such a delegated piece of legislation could not be applied retrospectively. The Persons with Disabilities Act came into force in 1995, while the respondent was declared medically unfit on 11 March 1998. The notification, which only saw the light of day in 2002, could not therefore affect the employer’s obligations that arose earlier. The Court stressed that the duty imposed by the Act is mandatory and not discretionary, leaving the appellants no option to discharge their obligation at their convenience.

The Bench recounted the factual background: the respondent had been employed as a driver with the CRPF since 1985. In 1996 he developed an ophthalmic condition, later diagnosed as Disseminated Choroiditis and Retinal Atrophic Patches with Macular Involvement, resulting in complete blindness in the left eye and partial impairment of vision in the right eye. After examination by the CRPF medical board, he was declared permanently unfit for further service, even in a combatant role, and was asked to submit a representation seeking full financial and service benefits. On 11 March 1998 he was invalidated from service. His subsequent representation was rejected, and he approached the Himachal Pradesh High Court, which directed the CRPF to reconsider the matter. The force reconsidered but again rejected the request on 27 June 2005, maintaining that the respondent was entitled only to a lump sum payment of Rs 15,000, as his disability was not found to be attributable to service.

The respondent then filed a writ petition before the High Court, asserting that he was unaware of his right under Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, which entitles an employee who acquires a disability during service to be retained in an alternative post. The High Court upheld his claim and directed the CRPF to grant him an alternate posting. The Union government appealed that decision to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, after examining the statutory provisions and the factual matrix, held that the CRPF had violated Section 47 by failing to offer an alternate post. It modified the High Court’s direction for reinstatement, noting that the respondent had already attained the age of superannuation. Consequently, the Court awarded him a composite amount of Rs 1.25 crore, comprising back wages, interest and costs, as compensation for the loss of service and benefits consequent upon the unlawful invalidation.

The judgment reinforces the peremptory character of Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act and underscores the obligation of government establishments to treat employees who acquire disabilities during service with due accommodation, failing which they may be held liable for substantial compensation. The decision also clarifies that subsequent notifications exempting certain categories of personnel cannot override the substantive rights conferred by the Act when those rights have already accrued.