The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the testimony of a witness who is no longer alive can be admitted against an accused person who had evaded trial by absconding at the stage when the evidence was originally recorded. The question arose in the context of an appeal where the prosecution sought to rely on a statement made by a witness who had died after the initial recording of evidence.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi considered the scope of Section 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Bench observed that the provision carves out a limited exception to the fundamental principle that evidence must be taken in the presence of the accused. The Court emphasized that the exception operates only when the statutory conditions are strictly satisfied.
The Court explained that Section 299 CrPC permits the recording of evidence in the absence of the accused when he has absconded or is avoiding trial, and such evidence may subsequently be used against him if he is later apprehended. The Bench stressed that the provision is intended to prevent the frustration of justice caused by an accused’s deliberate absence, while still safeguarding the accused’s right to a fair trial by requiring that the evidence have been recorded in compliance with procedural safeguards.
The Bench further noted that the admissibility of the deceased witness’s statement hinges on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in Section 299, which include proof that the accused had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to cross‑examine the witness at the time the evidence was taken, or that the circumstances justified the recording in his absence. The Court made clear that mere death of the witness does not automatically render the testimony inadmissible; the prosecution must demonstrate that the statutory prerequisites have been met.
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts before it, the Supreme Court concluded that the earlier testimony of the deceased witness could be utilized against the accused, who had absconded during the original trial, because the requirements of Section 299 CrPC were satisfied. The appeal was disposed of accordingly, with the Court directing that the trial proceed on the basis of the recorded evidence.
The ruling reinforces the utility of Section 299 CrPC as a mechanism to counteract attempts by an accused to evade prosecution through absconding. It clarifies that the death of a witness does not, by itself, extinguish the evidentiary value of a statement lawfully recorded under the provision. The decision also serves as a reminder to trial courts to scrutinize carefully whether the procedural conditions of Section 299 have been observed before admitting such evidence, thereby balancing the interests of efficient prosecution with the protection of the accused’s procedural rights.