The Punjab and Haryana High Court has quashed the dismissal of a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) who was removed from service by invoking the extraordinary power under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution. The dismissal was connected to the widely reported jail interview of gangster Lawrence Bishnoi, who was in custody at CIA Staff, Kharar, in connection with the Sidhu Moosewala murder investigation. The interview, aired in March 2023, prompted a suo motu PIL before the High Court and led to the registration of FIRs and a fresh SIT-led investigation.
The petitioner, a 2016-batch DSP in the Punjab Police, was posted as DSP (Detective), SAS Nagar, at the time of the incident. He was later transferred and posted as DSP (Special Branch & Criminal Intelligence), SAS Nagar. He cooperated with the Special Investigation Team (SIT) constituted by the court. Two show-cause notices were issued to him on 19.09.2024 and 14.10.2024, alleging lapses in supervising CIA Staff, Kharar. He responded to both notices. Subsequently, he was suspended and a formal charge-sheet was issued on 25.10.2024.
The charge-sheet, however, was not properly served. It was affixed at his old, vacated Chandigarh residence instead of his known permanent address in Jalandhar. The State was aware of his correct address, as it had previously issued show-cause notices to him at that location. Despite this, the charge-sheet was not served through any legally permissible mode. Before the petitioner could effectively respond to the charge-sheet, the State recommended his dismissal.
On 02.01.2025, he was dismissed from service by invoking Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution, which allows the government to dispense with a regular departmental enquiry in exceptional circumstances. The State justified the dismissal on the ground that the petitioner had adopted a non-cooperative attitude and had evaded service of the charge-sheet, thereby making the holding of an enquiry impracticable.
The court, however, found that the alleged non-cooperation and evasion of service did not meet the constitutional threshold for dispensing with an enquiry. Justice Namit Kumar observed that nothing had been placed on record to demonstrate that a genuine attempt was made to serve the charge-sheet upon the petitioner at his known permanent address in Jalandhar or through any other lawful mode. There was also no material to suggest that the petitioner had created a situation in which holding a departmental enquiry had become impracticable.
The court emphasized that non-service of the charge-sheet at an address from which the petitioner had already been transferred cannot be equated with deliberate evasion of service, particularly when the respondents were aware of his correct address and had initiated disciplinary proceedings by issuing show-cause notices and the charge-sheet itself.
Further, the court held that once the department had considered it feasible to initiate and proceed with regular disciplinary proceedings, the subsequent decision to abandon that course and resort to Article 311(2)(b) required the existence of a subsequent or newly arisen circumstance making the enquiry not reasonably practicable. The impugned order did not demonstrate the existence of any such circumstance.
The court relied on the Constitution Bench ruling in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, which held that the power to dispense with an enquiry under Article 311(2)(b) is exceptional and applies only when a situation genuinely renders an enquiry 'not reasonably practicable'. Mere allegations of non-cooperation or delay in responding to a charge-sheet do not satisfy this condition.
Notably, even after the petitioner's dismissal, a joint departmental enquiry covering him and eight other officers connected to the same episode continued. The enquiry was conducted by Justice Rajiv Narain Raina, a former Judge of the High Court. The petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Officer through virtual mode on multiple dates and filed a reply to the charge-sheet. Proceedings against him were finally closed in May 2026 on account of his prior dismissal.
The petitioner's senior counsel argued that dismissal is a major penalty which ordinarily requires a regular enquiry, and that Article 311(2)(b) can be invoked only in genuinely exceptional circumstances rendering an enquiry 'not reasonably practicable', not merely because an employee is uncooperative. The State defended the dismissal, contending that the petitioner had evaded service of the charge-sheet and shown a non-cooperative attitude amid the gravity of the allegations, justifying dispensation of the enquiry, and that due process, including PPSC consultation, had otherwise been followed.
The court rejected the State's contention and held that the dismissal, effected by dispensing with the enquiry under Article 311(2)(b), was not justified in law. The impugned order was accordingly quashed.