The petitioner, identified as Bharat Pathak @ Bharat Kumar Pathak, had been appointed as a constable in the Jharkhand Armed Police in 2007. A complaint was lodged by a woman who alleged that, despite both being married and having children, the petitioner had married her and maintained a physical relationship from October 2019 to April 2023 before refusing to continue the association. Following a preliminary inquiry, departmental proceedings were initiated against him. Simultaneously, an FIR was registered under Sections 417 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code. The disciplinary authority ultimately removed the petitioner from service under Rule 824(b) of the Police Manual, and the appellate authority affirmed that punishment.
Before the High Court, the petitioner challenged the dismissal order and the appellate order, contending that the penalty was imposed on a ground that never formed part of the departmental charge‑sheet. He argued that the enquiry report and the orders passed by the disciplinary and appellate authorities were non‑speaking, and that adultery could no longer be treated as a criminal offence after the Supreme Court’s decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India.
The Single Judge Bench of Justice Deepak Roshan examined the record and observed that the departmental charge framed against the petitioner was that, despite being married, he maintained a relationship with a married woman, amounting to indiscipline and bringing disrepute to the police department. However, the dismissal order was ultimately founded on an altogether different ground, namely the registration of an FIR under Section 376(2)(n) IPC. The Bench noted that both the dismissal order and the consequential punishment were based on a charge that had never been framed against the petitioner, thereby causing serious prejudice and violating the principles of natural justice.
The Court reiterated the settled proposition in service jurisprudence that an order of penalty can be passed only on the basis of specific charges which are framed against a delinquent. Because the punishment rested on an uncharged allegation, the order was deemed illegal.
Further, the Bench found that the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority had passed non‑speaking orders without adequately considering the petitioner’s defence. The departmental enquiry suffered from significant deficiencies: apart from the complainant’s statement, there was no documentary or independent evidence supporting the allegations. The enquiry recorded that no material had been produced to establish the alleged marriage, no CCTV footage from the hotels had been examined, and there was no evidence to show that the petitioner had resided in the rented accommodation allegedly shared with the complainant. Despite these shortcomings, the extreme penalty of removal from service was imposed.
Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 39, the High Court observed that the offence of adultery has been struck down and is no longer a criminal offence. The Court stated that such a provision cannot be considered beneficial legislation covered by Article 15(3) of the Constitution. It added that the respondents failed to consider that the complaint had been lodged by a disgruntled complainant and that the allegations did not fall within the ambit of moral turpitude, which cannot be invoked mechanically without judicial application of mind.
Having regard to the arbitrary and disproportionate nature of the impugned action, the High Court held that the dismissal order, the consequential order, and the appellate order violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Bench quashed the dismissal order, the consequential order, and the appellate order, restoring the petitioner to service with all consequential benefits.
The case is titled Bharat Pathak @ Bharat Kumar Pathak v. State of Jharkhand and Ors., W.P.(S) No. 1833 of 2026. Counsel for the petitioner appeared as Mr. Shresth Gautam, Mr. Shailesh Poddar, and Mr. Shashank.