The Tribunals Reforms Act 2026 received presidential assent on August 13, 2026, marking the fourth legislative attempt by the Union government to reform the appointment and functioning of tribunals in India following successive judicial invalidations of earlier measures. The Act seeks to respond to a line of Supreme Court judgments beginning with Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. (2019), through Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2020 and 2021), and culminating in the November 2025 ruling that found the Tribunals Reforms Act 2021 to be a mere re-enactment of previously struck-down provisions.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that Parliament may override a judicial ruling only by curing the specific defect identified in the judgment, not by re-enacting the same substance under a different statutory form. This principle was first articulated in the 2021 Madras Bar Association judgment and reaffirmed in November 2025, where the Court directed the constitution of an independent National Tribunals Commission within four months.
The Tribunals Reforms Act 2026 establishes such a Commission, responding directly to that direction. In terms of specific provisions, the Act increases the tenure of tribunal members from four to five years, changes the selection process to recommend one name along with a waitlisted candidate instead of a two-name panel, and requires the government to act on recommendations within three months. These changes represent a more precise response to the defects previously identified by the Court compared to earlier reforms.
However, the Act retains significant executive influence over the appointment and disciplinary processes. The selection committees, while modified in structure, continue to include government nominees, and the final appointing authority remains the Executive. The Court’s earlier rulings, particularly in L Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997), established that judicial review under Articles 226, 227, and 32 forms part of the Constitution’s basic structure and cannot be excluded. The Tribunalisation project, initiated by the Forty-second Amendment and expanded through subject-specific tribunals, has repeatedly faced judicial scrutiny because the government, as a frequent litigant before these bodies, cannot simultaneously control their composition and claim impartiality.
The Law Commission’s 272nd Report (2017) had recommended uniformity in tribunal appointments and functioning, which the government initially addressed through Part XIV of the Finance Act 2017 by merging tribunals and vesting rule-making power over appointments and service conditions in the Centre under Section 184. That provision became the focal point of four successive Supreme Court interventions, each striking it down on grounds of excessive executive control undermining tribunal independence.
While the Tribunals Reforms Act 2026 corrects certain mechanical flaws — such as short tenure and inflexible selection panels — it does not alter the fundamental dynamic whereby the Executive retains dominant influence over who serves on tribunals and under what conditions they serve. The Court’s standard, as developed across its judgments, requires not merely technical compliance but a substantive shift toward institutional independence that insulates tribunals from the very litigant-executive whose disputes they are meant to adjudicate fairly.
Thus, although the 2026 Act satisfies the letter of the Court’s earlier objections in several respects, it fails to meet the broader constitutional principle that those objections were designed to protect: the independence of tribunals as an essential component of the judicial review framework embedded in the basic structure of the Constitution. Until legislative reform ensures that appointment and discipline are genuinely insulated from executive control, particularly in forums where the State is a principal party, the standard set by the Supreme Court remains unmet.