The Allahabad High Court has ruled that the contents of a First Information Report cannot be established through the testimony of a scribe or an investigating officer when the first informant dies a natural death before the trial begins or before giving evidence. A Division Bench comprising Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Saurabh Srivastava delivered the judgment while disposing of a criminal appeal filed by Khalid and the deceased Nannu.
The Bench observed that the admissibility of a deceased person’s statement under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act is contingent upon a direct link between the statement and the cause of the declarant’s death or the circumstances leading to that death. In the absence of such a nexus, the protection offered by Section 32 does not extend to the contents of an FIR. Consequently, the scribe who recorded the FIR may only speak to the mechanical act of transcription and cannot be permitted to testify as to what was stated in the report.
The case originated from a January 2005 conviction by the Fast Track Court, Ghaziabad, which found Khalid and Nannu guilty of murdering Sarafraz alias Pappu and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The first informant in the matter was Wahiuddin, the father of the deceased, who passed away from natural causes prior to the commencement of trial. Since Wahiuddin could not be examined, the prosecution sought to prove the FIR’s contents through PW‑1, the police officer who had acted as the scribe.
The High Court rejected this approach, emphasizing that PW‑1’s evidence was limited to confirming that the FIR was dictated by the informant, transcribed accurately, and bore the signatures of both the informant and the scribe. The Bench clarified that such testimony does not amount to proof of the substantive allegations contained in the FIR.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on the Division Bench precedent in Pradeep v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) and the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement in Lalita v. Vishwanath and others (2025). The Supreme Court had held that unless an FIR bears a connection to the informant’s death, the deposition of its contents by an investigating officer or a scribe cannot be treated as substantive evidence. The Allahabad Bench echoed this principle, stating that the FIR cannot be treated as a dying declaration merely because the informant is deceased.
The Bench further noted that the inability to prove the FIR does not fataly undermine the prosecution’s case; the State may still rely on other evidence adduced during trial. However, it pointed out a practical disadvantage: the earliest contemporaneous account of the incident, which a properly proved FIR would provide, becomes unavailable. The Court described an unchallenged FIR as a treasured and reliable repository of facts unless impeached by strong contradictory evidence.
On the merits of the appeal, the High Court expressed serious doubts about the prosecution’s narrative. According to the State, on 7 January 1990 a dispute arose over the borrowing of a tractor‑trolley, after which Khalid directed his servant Nannu to seize Sarafraz from behind. Khalid then allegedly fired a double‑barreled shotgun, the informant grabbed the weapon causing a deflected shot to strike Nannu’s legs, following which Khalid drew a pistol and shot Sarafraz in the head, killing him. The defence countered that Sarafraz died accidentally from a bullet fired by his own family members during a scuffle when they attacked Khalid.
The Bench characterised the prosecution’s version as “almost unbelievable”, remarking that it strains credibility for an assailant to instruct his own servant to hold the victim while committing the act. After evaluating the evidence, the Court found the prosecution’s case to be highly improbable and consequently set aside the conviction and sentence.
The judgment underscores the strict limits placed on hearsay exceptions and reinforces the requirement that any attempt to rely on a deceased informant’s statement must demonstrate a factual connection to the cause of death. It also serves as a reminder that while procedural gaps in proving an FIR may be overcome through alternative evidence, the loss of the original contemporaneous account remains a significant evidentiary handicap.