The The Allahabad High Court recently examined an appeal arising from a conviction for causing grievous hurt under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code in the matter of Razzak v. State of UP. The bench, presided over by Justice Santosh Rai, took issue with the trial court’s decision to convict the accused solely for grievous hurt despite evidence that suggested a more serious offence.

According to the prosecution, on 5 September 1981 the accused, Razzak, poured acid on his father, Gulam Husain, during a quarrel inside their shared residence in Gorakhpur. The father sustained acid burns covering approximately sixty percent of his body. He remained under medical care for about three weeks before succumbing to septicaemia and exhaustion caused by the injuries. The trial court had originally framed a charge of murder under Section 302 IPC but ultimately recorded a conviction only under Section 326 IPC, imposing a sentence of three years’ rigorous imprisonment and omitting any fine.

The High Court observed that the trial judge had failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record. It noted that the father’s statement, recorded by the investigating officer while he was in hospital, was admissible as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. The Court further pointed out that the accused had admitted, in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that acid had been thrown during the scuffle but was unable to explain how his father suffered the extensive injuries. Additionally, the accused attempted to flee the scene instead of rendering assistance or securing medical aid for his father, a fact the Court characterised as indicative of mala fide conduct.

Justice Santosh Rai remarked that the trial court’s approach amounted to an extraordinary and unwarranted leniency. The Court emphasised that judicial discretion must not be conflated with judicial arbitrariness and that sympathy or misplaced leniency has no place where the statute and the evidence demand a reasoned and lawful adjudication. The High Court held that, given the nature of the injuries and the circumstances surrounding the offence, the trial judge ought to have examined whether the act attracted the provisions of Section 302 IPC (murder) or, at the very least, Section 304 IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder).

Despite these criticisms, the High Court declined to interfere with the sentence imposed by the trial court. It explained that the appeal had been filed solely by the accused, while the State had not preferred any appeal or revision seeking an enhancement of punishment. In the absence of such a State‑initiated challenge, the Court felt constrained from converting the conviction to a graver offence or increasing the term of imprisonment. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the accused’s appeal, rejected his plea for probation, and directed him to surrender within two weeks to serve the remainder of his sentence.

The Court also noted that the trial court had omitted to impose a fine despite Section 326 IPC prescribing both imprisonment and fine. This omission was cited as another facet of the trial court’s flawed appreciation of the statutory provisions. The High Court termed the trial court’s approach a serious miscarriage of justice, reiterating that judicial sympathy cannot override the law.

In its final observations, the Bench underscored that the accused’s own injuries were superficial in comparison to the extensive burns suffered by the father, reinforcing the conclusion that the act was deliberate and not accidental. The High Court’s decision serves as a reminder that trial courts must carefully evaluate all available evidence, including dying declarations and the conduct of the accused after the offence, before determining the appropriate charge and sentence.