The Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed the preventive detention of a woman under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (PITNDPS Act), finding that the authorities’ failure to promptly inform her of her right to make a representation to the Central Government, followed by undue delays in forwarding and deciding that representation, violated the constitutional safeguards under Article 22(5). The Court was hearing a habeas corpus petition challenging the detention order dated November 1, 2025, passed by the Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration.
Justice Virinder Aggarwal, observing the sequence of events, noted that the petitioner was informed on November 3, 2025, of her right to make representations to the Detaining Authority, the Chief Secretary, and the Advisory Board. She submitted such representations on November 26, 2025. However, it was only on December 16, 2025, that she was apprised of her right to make a representation to the Central Government. She exercised that right by submitting her representation to the Central Government on December 24, 2025.
The Court highlighted that the representation addressed to the Central Government was forwarded by the Chandigarh Administration on February 3, 2026, and received by the PITNDPS Division of the Central Government only on March 16, 2026—a delay of nearly three months. The Central Government then called for para-wise comments and relevant material on March 18, 2026. The Chandigarh Administration furnished the requisite material on May 24, 2026, after which the representation was rejected on June 2, 2026. Thus, the representation remained pending for approximately five months from submission to decision.
The Court further observed that the representations submitted to the Chandigarh authorities on November 26, 2025, were rejected by the Home Secretary on February 25, 2026, and by the Chief Secretary on February 23, 2026. The Advisory Board confirmed her detention on January 16, 2026.
Justice Aggarwal emphasized that there was no satisfactory explanation for the approximately 45-day delay in informing the detenue of her right to approach the Central Government. The Court stated, ‘There is delay at every step i.e. informing about rights, forwarding of representations, furnishing of comments and decision of representations,’ and held that the delays of three months and five months amounted to a flagrant violation of Article 22(5) and a denial of the detenue’s fundamental right.
The Court relied upon Supreme Court judgments in Alfiya A. v. State of Kerala, Jaseela Shaji v. Union of India, and Sarabjeet Singh Mokha v. District Magistrate, Jabalpur, to reiterate that Article 22(5) imposes a constitutional obligation on the detaining authority to afford the detenue the earliest opportunity to make a representation and to inform her of the authorities to whom such representation may be made. The right to make a representation to the Central Government is an independent constitutional safeguard, and failure to communicate this right renders the opportunity to make an effective representation incomplete.
The Court further emphasized that the obligation does not end with informing the detenue of her right. Citing the Supreme Court’s observation in Jaseela Shaji that ‘each day’s delay matters’ in matters concerning personal liberty, the Court held that a representation, once made, must be considered and decided with utmost expedition and without avoidable or unexplained delay.
The petitioner had earlier been detained under a previous detention order, which was set aside by the Advisory Board in July 2025. She was released thereafter. Subsequently, an FIR was registered against her and 21 others under Section 21 of the NDPS Act at Police Station Sector 39, Chandigarh. She contended that the FIR was based on alleged secret information regarding narcotics, but no search was conducted, no contraband was recovered, and no accused was arrested. The fresh detention order was passed on November 1, 2025, approximately three months after the FIR’s registration. The petitioner argued that the fresh detention order substantially relied on material that had already formed the basis of the earlier detention order set aside by the Advisory Board, with the subsequent FIR being the principal new circumstance.
Concluding that the procedural lapses violated the core tenets of Article 22(5), the Court quashed the detention order dated November 1, 2025, and directed the immediate release of the petitioner, if not already released.