The Jharkhand High Court, in a judgment delivered by a division bench comprising Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad and Justice Rajesh Shankar, has affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed on two individuals in a gang rape case that originated in the state of Jharkhand. The bench dismissed criminal appeals filed by the accused challenging the judgment and order of the Additional Sessions Judge, which had found them guilty of offences under Sections 376(2)(g) and 376D of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 34 thereof.
The prosecution’s case rested on the statement of the prosecutrix, who alleged that she was abducted by the accused persons on a specific date and subjected to sexual assault by multiple individuals over a period of time. The accused contended before the High Court that two key aspects of the prosecution’s narrative undermined the credibility of the victim’s account: the non-detection of sperm in the medico-legal report conducted approximately 72 hours after the alleged incident, and a three-day delay in lodging the first information report (FIR).
Addressing the argument concerning sperm detection, the court observed that the absence of spermatozoa in the vaginal swab does not, by itself, invalidate the occurrence of sexual intercourse. The bench relied on established medical jurisprudence to note that sperm may not be detectable beyond a certain period due to natural biological processes, including vaginal clearance, the acidic environment of the vagina, and the motile nature of sperm, which may lead to their expulsion or degradation within hours. The court emphasized that the non-detection of sperm after 72 hours cannot be equated with non-occurrence of the act, particularly when other corroborative evidence, including injuries and the victim’s consistent statement, supports the prosecution’s version.
On the issue of the three-day delay in filing the FIR, the court held that such a delay, in the context of a sexual offence, especially one committed against a woman from a vulnerable background, does not automatically raise suspicion or warrant disbelief of the prosecutrix. The bench noted that delays in reporting sexual offences are not uncommon and may stem from a variety of factors, including fear of social stigma, intimidation by the accused, lack of awareness about legal remedies, or the victim’s psychological state following the trauma. The court reiterated that mere delay, without evidence of malafide intent or tutoring, cannot be used to discredit the victim’s testimony, particularly when the prosecutrix offered a plausible explanation for the delay that was found credible by the trial court.
The High Court further noted that the trial court had carefully evaluated the prosecutrix’s testimony, finding it to be consistent, natural, and free from embellishment or exaggeration. The bench observed that the victim had withstood rigorous cross-examination without contradiction on material points, and her account was supported by circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of her belongings from the possession of the accused and medical evidence indicating recent sexual activity and injuries consistent with forcible intercourse.
In rejecting the appeals, the division bench held that the trial court had rightly relied on the prosecutrix’s statement as the cornerstone of the prosecution’s case, corroborated by other evidence on record. The court concluded that the appellants had failed to demonstrate any illegality, irregularity, or infirmity in the trial court’s judgment that would warrant interference. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed, and the conviction and sentence of the accused were affirmed.
The judgment underscores the importance of interpreting medical and procedural evidence in sexual offence cases in light of contemporary understanding of victim behaviour and biological realities, rather than relying on outdated or rigid assumptions about sperm detection timelines or reporting delays as automatic indicators of falsehood.