The Supreme Court in Dr Lokesh BH & Ors v. State of Karnataka has clarified the applicability of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code to live-in relationships under certain conditions. A Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Karol and NK Singh held that the provision, which penalises cruelty by a husband or his relatives towards a wife, can extend to individuals in a live-in relationship that is 'in the nature of marriage'.
The Court observed that the legislative intent behind Section 498A is to prevent cruelty against women in marital relationships, and this protection should not be defeated merely because the parties did not undergo a formal marriage ceremony. The Bench emphasised that a man should not be allowed to evade criminal liability for acts of cruelty solely on the ground that he avoided performing a marriage ritual.
For Section 498A to apply, the Court laid down two essential requirements: first, the live-in relationship must be 'in the nature of marriage'; and second, both partners must genuinely intend the relationship to be marital in character. The Court drew upon its earlier jurisprudence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, particularly the judgments in D Velusamy v. D Patchaiammal (2010) and Indra Sarma v. VKV Sarma (2013), to define what constitutes a relationship 'in the nature of marriage'.
According to those precedents, such a relationship must exhibit certain marital trappings, including shared household, pooling of financial resources, domestic arrangements resembling those of a married couple, and social recognition as a couple. The Court clarified that not every casual or weekend association qualifies; the relationship must demonstrate stability, commitment, and mutual responsibilities akin to marriage.
The Bench noted that the evolution of legal protections for women in non-marital cohabitation began with the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which introduced the concept of 'relationship in the nature of marriage' to grant civil remedies like protection orders and right to residence. The Court affirmed that extending criminal liability under Section 498A to such relationships is a logical progression aimed at closing loopholes that could allow perpetrators to escape accountability by avoiding marriage.
The judgment, while acknowledging the protective rationale, also raises broader questions about the legal distinction between marriage and live-in relationships. The Court did not address these societal or policy implications directly, confining its analysis to the legal criteria for applying Section 498A. It stressed that its interpretation is driven by the need to protect women from cruelty, irrespective of the form of cohabitation.
The Court did not examine whether extending marital legal consequences to live-in relationships undermines the autonomy of individuals who choose cohabitation precisely to avoid marital obligations. Nor did it consider the social practicalities faced by unmarried couples, such as difficulties in renting accommodation or societal scrutiny from resident welfare associations or family members.
The operative outcome of the judgment is that individuals in live-in relationships meeting the criteria of being 'in the nature of marriage' with mutual intent to be marital can now be proceeded against under Section 498A of the IPC or its equivalent in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita for acts of cruelty. The Bench made clear that the absence of a marriage ceremony is not a defence to criminal liability under this provision when the relationship substantially resembles marriage in fact and intention.
The judgment reflects a continued judicial trend of recognising functional equivalence between marriage and certain long-term live-in relationships for the purpose of extending legal protections, particularly in the context of preventing violence and cruelty against women. The Court’s reasoning remains anchored in safeguarding vulnerable partners from exploitation, rather than endorsing or regulating the choice to cohabit outside marriage.