The matter came before Justice Saugata Bhattacharya of the Calcutta High Court on a petition filed by a group of hawkers who alleged that their removal from the Mangla Haat market was carried out without municipal sanction, prior notice or any provision for rehabilitation. The petitioners contended that the eviction infringed upon their right to livelihood protected under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Senior Advocate Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, appearing for the hawkers, submitted that the families of the petitioners had been engaged in vending at the said location for several generations. He argued that this long‑standing occupation formed an integral part of their right to live and earn a livelihood. In support of this contention, he relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Olga Tellis & Ors v Bombay Municipal Corporation, which recognised the right to livelihood as a facet of the right to life. He further submitted that the police action, undertaken without the approval of the Howrah Municipal Corporation, was procedurally flawed and substantively violative of constitutional guarantees, particularly because the vendors were not afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard or to be rehabilitated.
In contrast, the Additional Advocate General Billwadal Bhattacharya, representing the State, maintained that the hawkers possessed no vested or proprietary right to occupy the specific stretch of footpath where the market operates. He emphasised that the unregulated presence of stalls impeded vehicular movement, caused traffic congestion and created hazards for pedestrians. According to his submissions, the police were entitled to clear the road to ensure the smooth flow of traffic and to uphold public order, and that such action did not require prior municipal approval when undertaken to prevent obstruction.
Upon hearing the submissions, Justice Bhattacharya framed the central question as whether the hawkers’ claim to livelihood outweighed the public’s right to use the footpath. He noted that the Supreme Court had recently addressed a similar tension between private commercial activity and public use of streets, although he did not elaborate on the precise holding. The court observed that, in the absence of an interim stay, the police remained free to take steps as prescribed by law to address any obstruction or violation of municipal regulations.
Consequently, the court declined to grant interim relief and directed both parties to file detailed affidavits within a period of three weeks. The matter was adjourned for further hearing after the affidavits are placed on record. The order makes it clear that no restraint has been placed on the executive’s authority to act in the interim, and that the final determination will depend on the factual matrix to be established through the affidavits.
The decision underscores the balancing act that courts often undertake when weighing constitutional claims of livelihood against regulatory powers aimed at maintaining public convenience and safety. It also highlights the procedural requirement that any claim of unlawful eviction must be substantiated with evidence regarding notice, opportunity to be heard and the availability of rehabilitation measures, issues that the parties are now required to address in their forthcoming affidavits.